3623a89c7c9767c9de85c166b5d105e1e7ee8d24
[libreriscv.git] / isa_conflict_resolution.mdwn
1 # Resolving ISA conflicts and providing a pain-free RISC-V Standards Upgrade Path
2
3 In a lengthy thread that ironically was full of conflict indicative
4 of the future direction in which RISC-V will go if left unresolved,
5 multiple Custom Extensions were noted to be permitted free rein to
6 introduce global binary-encoding conflict with no means of resolution
7 described or endorsed by the RISC-V Standard: a practice that has known
8 disastrous and irreversible consequences for any architecture that
9 permits such practices (1).
10
11 Much later on in the discussion it was realised that there is also no way
12 within the current RISC-V Specification to transition to improved versions
13 of the standard, regardless of whether the fixes are absolutely critical
14 show-stoppers or whether they are just keeping the standard up-to-date (2).
15
16 With no transition path there is guaranteed to be tension and conflict
17 within the RISC-V Community over whether revisions should be made:
18 should existing legacy designs be prioritised, mutually-exclusively over
19 future designs (and what happens during the transition period is absolute
20 chaos, with the compiler toolchain, software ecosystem and ultimately
21 the end-users bearing the full brunt of the impact). If several
22 overlapping revisions are required that have not yet transitioned out
23 of use (which could take well over two decades to occur) the situation
24 becomes disastrous for the credibility of the entire RISC-V ecosystem.
25
26 It was also pointed out that Compliance is an extremely important factor
27 to take into consideration, and that Custom Extensions (as being optional)
28 effectively and quite reasonably fall entirely outside of the scope of
29 Compliance Testing. At this point in the discussion however it was not
30 yet noted the stark problem that the *mandatory* RISC-V Specification
31 also faces, by virtue of there being no transitional way to bring in
32 show-stopping critical alterations.
33
34 To put this into perspective, just taking into account hardware costs
35 alone: with production mask charges for 28nm being around USD $1.5m,
36 engineering development costs and licensing of RTLs for peripherals
37 being of a similar magnitude, no manufacturer is going to back away
38 from selling a "flawed" or "legacy" product (whether it complies with
39 the RISC-V Specification or not) without a bitter fight.
40
41 It was also pointed out that there will be significant software tool
42 maintenance costs for manufacturers, meaning that the probability will
43 be extremely high that they will refuse to shoulder such costs, and
44 will publish and continue to publish (and use) hopelessly out-of-date
45 unpatched tools. This practice is well-known to result in security
46 flaws going unpatched, with one of many immediate undesirable consequences
47 being that product in extremely large volume gets discarded into landfill.
48
49 **All and any of the issues that were discussed, and all of those that
50 were not, can be avoided by providing a hardware-level runtime-enabled
51 forwards and backwards compatible transition path between *all* parts
52 (mandatory or not) of current and future revisions of the RISC-V ISA
53 Standard.**
54
55 The rest of the discussion - indicative as it was of the stark mutually
56 exclusive gap being faced by the RISC-V ISA Standard given that it does
57 not cope with the problem - was an effort by two groups in two clear
58 camps: one that wanted things to remain as they are, and another that
59 made efforts to point out that the consequences of not taking action
60 are clearly extreme and irreversible (which, unfortunately, given the
61 severity, some of the first group were unable to believe, despite there
62 being clear historical precedent for the exact same mistake being made in
63 other architectures, and the consequences on the same being absolutely
64 clear).
65
66 However after a significant amount of time, certain clear requirements came
67 out of the discussion:
68
69 * Any proposal must be a minimal change with minimal (or zero) impact
70 * Any proposal should place no restriction on existing or future
71 ISA encoding space
72 * Any proposal should take into account that there are existing implementors
73 of the (yet to be finalised but still "partly frozen") Standard who may
74 resist, for financial investment reasons, efforts to make any change
75 (at all) that could cost them immediate short-term profits.
76
77 Several proposals were put forward (and some are still under discussion)
78
79 * "Do nothing": problem is not severe: no action needed.
80 * "Do nothing": problem is out-of-scope for RISC-V Foundation.
81 * "Do nothing": problem complicates Compliance Testing (and is out of scope)
82 * "MISA": the MISA CSR enables and disables extensions already: use that
83 * "MISA-like": a new CSR which switches in and out new encodings
84 (without destroying state)
85 * "mvendorid/marchid WARL": switching the entire "identity" of a machine
86 * "ioctl-like": a OO proposal based around the linux kernel "ioctl" system.
87
88 Each of these will be discussed below in their own sections.
89
90 # Do nothing (no problem exists)
91
92 TBD (basically not an option).
93
94 There were several solutions offered that fell into this category.
95 A few of them are listed in the introduction; more are listed below,
96 and it was exhaustively (and exhaustingly) established that none of
97 them are workable.
98
99 Initially it was pointed out that Fabless Semiconductor companies could
100 simply license multiple Custom Extensions and a suitable RISC-V core, and
101 modify them accordingly. The Fabless Semi Company would be responsible
102 for paying the NREs on re-developing the test vectors (as the extension
103 licensers would be extremely unlikely to do that without payment), and
104 given that said Companies have an "integration" job to do, it would
105 be reasonable to expect them to have such additional costs as well.
106
107 The costs of this approach were outlined and discussed as being
108 disproportionate and extreme compared to the actual likely cost of
109 licensing the Custom Extensions in the first place. Additionally it
110 was pointed out that not only hardware NREs would be involved but
111 custom software tools (compilers and more) would also be required
112 (and maintained separately, on the basis that upstream would not
113 accept them except under extreme pressure, and then only with
114 prejudice).
115
116 All similar schemes involving customisation of the custom extensions
117 were likewise rejected, but not before the customisation process was
118 mistakenly conflated with tne *normal* integration process of developing
119 a custom processor (Bus Architectures, Cache layouts, peripheral layouts).
120
121 The most compelling hardware-related reason (excluding the severe impact on
122 the software ecosystem) for rejecting the customisation-of-customisation
123 approach was the case where Extensions were using an instruction encoding
124 space (48-bit, 64-bit) *greater* than that which the chosen core could
125 cope with (32-bit, 48-bit).
126
127 Overall, none of the options presented were feasible, and, in addition,
128 even if they were followed through, still would result in the failure
129 of the RISC-V ecosystem due to global conflicting ISA binary-encoding
130 meanings (POWERPC's Altivec / SPE nightmare).
131
132 # Do nothing (out of scope)
133
134 TBD (basically, may not be RV Foundation's "scope", still results in
135 problem, so not an option)
136
137 This was one of the first arguments presented: The RISC-V Foundation
138 considers Custom Extensions to be "out of scope"; that "it's not their
139 problem, therefore there isn't a problem".
140
141 The logical errors in this argument were quickly enumerated: namely
142 that the RISC-V Foundation is not in control of the use-cases, such
143 that binary-encoding is a hundred percent guaranteed to occur, and
144 a hundred percent guaranteed to occur in *commodity* hardware where
145 Debian, Fedora, SUSE and other distros will be hardest hit by the
146 resultant chaos, and that will just be the more "visible" aspect of
147 the underlying problem.
148
149 # Do nothing (Compliance too complex, therefore out of scope)
150
151 TBD (basically, may not be RV Foundation's "scope", still results in
152 problem, so not an option)
153
154 Two interestingly diametrically-opposed equally valid arguments exist here:
155
156 * Whilst Compliance testing of Custom Extensions is definitely legitimately
157 out of scope, Compliance testing of simultaneous legacy (old revisions of
158 ISA Standards) and current (new revisions of ISA Standard) definitely
159 is not. Efforts to reduce *Compliance Testing* complexity is therefore
160 "Compliance Tail Wagging Standard Dog".
161 * Beyond a certain threshold, complexity of Compliance Testing is so
162 burdensome that it risks outright rejection of the entire Standard.
163
164 Meeting these two diametrically-opposed perspectives requires that the
165 solution be very, very simple.
166
167 # MISA
168
169 TBD, basically MISA not suitable
170
171 MISA permits extensions to be disabled by masking out the relevant bit.
172 Hypothetically it could be used to disable one extension, then enable
173 another that happens to use the same binary encoding.
174
175 *However*:
176
177 * MISA Extension disabling is permitted (optionally) to **destroy**
178 the state information. Thus it is totally unsuitable for cases
179 where instructions from different Custom extensions are needed in
180 quick succession.
181 * MISA was only designed to cover Standard Extensions.
182 * There is nothing to prevent multiple Extensions being enabled
183 that wish to simultaneously interpret the same binary encoding.
184
185 Overall, whilst the MISA concept is a step in the right direction it's
186 a hundred percent unsuitable for solving the problem.
187
188 # MISA-like
189
190 TBD, basically same as mvend/march WARL except needs an extra CSR where
191 mv/ma doesn't.
192
193 # mvendorid/marchid WARL
194
195 TBD paraphrase and clarify
196
197 > In an earlier part of the thread someone kindly pointed out that MISA
198 > already switches out entire sets of instructions [which interacts at the
199 > "decode" phase]. However it was noted after a few days of investigating
200 > that particular lead that:
201 >
202 > * MISA Extension disabling is permitted (optionally) to DESTROY the state
203 > information (which means that it *has* to be re-initialised just to be
204 > safe... mistake in the standard, there), and * MISA was only designed
205 > to cover Standard Extensions.
206 >
207 > So the practice of switching extensions in and out - and the resultant
208 > "disablement" and "enablement" at the *instruction decode phase* is
209 > *already* a hard requirement as part of conforming with the present
210 > RISC-V Specification.
211 >
212 > Around the same MISA discussion, someone else also kindly pointed out
213 > that one solution to the heavyweight nature of the switching would
214 > be to deliberately introduce a pipeline stall whilst the switching is
215 > occurring: I can see the sense in that approach, even if I don't know the
216 > full details of what each implementor might choose to do. They may even
217 > choose two, or three, or N pipeline stalls: it really doesn't matter,
218 > as it's an implementors' choice (and problem to solve).
219 >
220 > So yes it's pretty heavy-duty... and also already required.
221 >
222 > For the case where "legacy" variants of the RISC-V Standard are
223 > backwards-forwards-compatibly supported over a 10-20 year period
224 > in Industrial and Military/Goverment-procurement scenarios (so that
225 > the impossible-to-achieve pressure is off to get the spec ABSOLUTELY
226 > correct, RIGHT now), nobody would expect a seriously heavy-duty amount
227 > of instruction-by-instruction switching: it'd be used pretty much once
228 > and only once at boot-up (or once in a Hypervisor Virtual Machine client)
229 > and that's it.
230 >
231 > I can however foresee instances where implementors would actually
232 > genuinely want a bank of operations to be carried out using one extension,
233 > followed immediately by another bank from a (conflicting binary-encoding)
234 > extension, in an inner loop: Software-defined MPEG / MP4 decode to call
235 > DCT block decode Custom Extension followed immediately by Custom Video
236 > Processing Extension followed immediately by Custom DSP Processing
237 > Extension to do YUV-to-RGB conversion for example is something that
238 > is clearly desirable. Solving that one would be entiiirely their
239 > problem... and the RISC-V Specification really really should give them
240 > the space to do that in a clear-cut unambiguous way.
241
242 # ioctl-like
243
244 TBD - [[ioctl]] for full details, summary kept here
245
246 # Discussion and analysis
247
248 TBD
249
250 # Conclusion
251
252 TBD
253
254 # Conversation Exerpts
255
256 The following conversation exerpts are taken from the ISA-dev discussion
257
258 ## (1) Albert Calahan on SPE / Altiven conflict in POWERPC
259
260 > Yes. Well, it should be blocked via legal means. Incompatibility is
261 > a disaster for an architecture.
262 >
263 > The viability of PowerPC was badly damaged when SPE was
264 > introduced. This was a vector instruction set that was incompatible
265 > with the AltiVec instruction set. Software vendors had to choose,
266 > and typically the choice was "neither". Nobody wants to put in the
267 > effort when there is uncertainty and a market fragmented into
268 > small bits.
269 > Note how Intel did not screw up. When SSE was added, MMX remained.
270 > Software vendors could trust that instructions would be supported.
271 > Both MMX and SSE remain today, in all shipping processors. With very
272 > few exceptions, Intel does not ship chips with missing functionality.
273 > There is a unified software ecosystem.
274 >
275 > This goes beyond the instruction set. MMU functionality also matters.
276 > You can add stuff, but then it must be implemented in every future CPU.
277 > You can not take stuff away without harming the architecture.
278
279 ## (2) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton on Standards backwards-compatibility
280
281 > For the case where "legacy" variants of the RISC-V Standard are
282 > backwards-forwards-compatibly supported over a 10-20 year period in
283 > Industrial and Military/Goverment-procurement scenarios (so that the
284 > impossible-to-achieve pressure is off to get the spec ABSOLUTELY
285 > correct, RIGHT now), nobody would expect a seriously heavy-duty amount
286 > of instruction-by-instruction switching: it'd be used pretty much once
287 > and only once at boot-up (or once in a Hypervisor Virtual Machine
288 > client) and that's it.
289
290 ## (3) Allen Baum on Standards Compliance
291
292 > Putting my compliance chair hat on: One point that was made quite
293 > clear to me is that compliance will only test that an implementation
294 > correctly implements the portions of the spec that are mandatory, and
295 > the portions of the spec that are optional and the implementor claims
296 > it is implementing. It will test nothing in the custom extension space,
297 > and doesn't monitor or care what is in that space.
298