From 25ede9c3cf35e7f58f92bd02f90e3cd3ffeab193 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton Date: Thu, 26 Apr 2018 08:13:19 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] start filling in --- isa_conflict_resolution.mdwn | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 85 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/isa_conflict_resolution.mdwn b/isa_conflict_resolution.mdwn index f081e009e..d0ed7ad6f 100644 --- a/isa_conflict_resolution.mdwn +++ b/isa_conflict_resolution.mdwn @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ Several proposals were put forward (and some are still under discussion) * "Do nothing": problem is not severe: no action needed. * "Do nothing": problem is out-of-scope for RISC-V Foundation. +* "Do nothing": problem complicates Compliance Testing (and is out of scope) * "MISA": the MISA CSR enables and disables extensions already: use that * "MISA-like": a new CSR which switches in and out new encodings (without destroying state) @@ -77,20 +78,100 @@ Each of these will be discussed below in their own sections. TBD (basically not an option). +There were several solutions offered that fell into this category. +A few of them are listed in the introduction; more are listed below, +and it was exhaustively (and exhaustingly) established that none of +them are workable. + +Initially it was pointed out that Fabless Semiconductor companies could +simply license multiple Custom Extensions and a suitable RISC-V core, and +modify them accordingly. The Fabless Semi Company would be responsible +for paying the NREs on re-developing the test vectors (as the extension +licensers would be extremely unlikely to do that without payment), and +given that said Companies have an "integration" job to do, it would +be reasonable to expect them to have such additional costs as well. + +The costs of this approach were outlined and discussed as being +disproportionate and extreme compared to the actual likely cost of +licensing the Custom Extensions in the first place. Additionally it +was pointed out that not only hardware NREs would be involved but +custom software tools (compilers and more) would also be required +(and maintained separately, on the basis that upstream would not +accept them except under extreme pressure, and then only with +prejudice). + +All similar schemes involving customisation of the custom extensions +were likewise rejected, but not before the customisation process was +mistakenly conflated with tne *normal* integration process of developing +a custom processor (Bus Architectures, Cache layouts, peripheral layouts). + +The most compelling hardware-related reason (excluding the severe impact on +the software ecosystem) for rejecting the customisation-of-customisation +approach was the case where Extensions were using an instruction encoding +space (48-bit, 64-bit) *greater* than that which the chosen core could +cope with (32-bit, 48-bit). + +Overall, none of the options presented were feasible, and, in addition, +even if they were followed through, still would result in the failure +of the RISC-V ecosystem due to global conflicting ISA binary-encoding +meanings (POWERPC's Altivec / SPE nightmare). + # Do nothing (out of scope) TBD (basically, may not be RV Foundation's "scope", still results in problem, so not an option) +This was one of the first arguments presented: The RISC-V Foundation +considers Custom Extensions to be "out of scope"; that "it's not their +problem, therefore there isn't a problem". + +The logical errors in this argument were quickly enumerated: namely +that the RISC-V Foundation is not in control of the use-cases, such +that binary-encoding is a hundred percent guaranteed to occur, and +a hundred percent guaranteed to occur in *commodity* hardware where +Debian, Fedora, SUSE and other distros will be hardest hit by the +resultant chaos, and that will just be the more "visible" aspect of +the underlying problem. + +# Do nothing (Compliance too complex, therefore out of scope) + +TBD (basically, may not be RV Foundation's "scope", still results in +problem, so not an option) + +Two interestingly diametrically-opposed equally valid arguments exist here: + +* Whilst Compliance testing of Custom Extensions is definitely legitimately + out of scope, Compliance testing of simultaneous legacy (old revisions of + ISA Standards) and current (new revisions of ISA Standard) definitely + is not. Efforts to reduce *Compliance Testing* complexity is therefore + "Compliance Tail Wagging Standard Dog". +* Beyond a certain threshold, complexity of Compliance Testing is so + burdensome that it risks outright rejection of the entire Standard. + +Meeting these two diametrically-opposed perspectives requires that the +solution be very, very simple. + # MISA TBD, basically MISA not suitable -> * MISA Extension disabling is permitted (optionally) to DESTROY the state -> information (which means that it *has* to be re-initialised just to be -> safe... mistake in the standard, there), and -> * MISA was only designed to cover Standard Extensions. +MISA permits extensions to be disabled by masking out the relevant bit. +Hypothetically it could be used to disable one extension, then enable +another that happens to use the same binary encoding. + +*However*: + +* MISA Extension disabling is permitted (optionally) to **destroy** + the state information. Thus it is totally unsuitable for cases + where instructions from different Custom extensions are needed in + quick succession. +* MISA was only designed to cover Standard Extensions. +* There is nothing to prevent multiple Extensions being enabled + that wish to simultaneously interpret the same binary encoding. +Overall, whilst the MISA concept is a step in the right direction it's +a hundred percent unsuitable for solving the problem. + # MISA-like TBD, basically same as mvend/march WARL except needs an extra CSR where -- 2.30.2