The logical errors in this argument were quickly enumerated: namely that
the RISC-V Foundation is not in control of the uses to which RISC-V is
put, such that public global conflicts in binary-encoding are a hundred
-percent guaranteed to occur, and a hundred percent guaranteed to occur in
+percent guaranteed to occur (*outside* of the control and remit of the
+RISC-V Foundation), and a hundred percent guaranteed to occur in
*commodity* hardware where Debian, Fedora, SUSE and other distros will
be hardest hit by the resultant chaos, and that will just be the more
"visible" aspect of the underlying problem.
* MISA was only designed to cover Standard Extensions.
* There is nothing to prevent multiple Extensions being enabled
that wish to simultaneously interpret the same binary encoding.
+* There is nothing in the MISA specification which permits
+ *future* versions (bug-fixes) of the RISC-V ISA to be "switched in".
Overall, whilst the MISA concept is a step in the right direction it's
a hundred percent unsuitable for solving the problem.
* Each custom-defined bit of the MISA-like CSR would (mutually-exclusively)
redirect binary encoding(s) to specific encodings
* No Extension would *actually* be disabled: its internal state would
- be left on (permanently) so that switching could be done inside
- inner loops.
+ be left on (permanently) so that switching of ISA decoding
+ could be done inside inner loops without adverse impact on
+ performance.
Whilst it was the first "workable" solution it was also noted that the
-scheme is quite invasive: it requires an entirely new CSR to be added
-to the privileged spec. This does not completely fulfil the "minimum
-impact" requirement.
+scheme is invasive: it requires an entirely new CSR to be added
+to the privileged spec (thus making existing implementations redundant).
+This does not fulfil the "minimum impact" requirement.
Also interesting around the same time an additional discussion was
raised that covered the *compiler* side of the same equation. This
TBD paraphrase and clarify
-Coming out of the software-related proposal by Jacob, which hinged on
-the idea of a global gcc / binutils database that kept and coordinated
-architectural encodings, was to quite simply make the mvendorid and
-marchid CSRs have WARL (writeable) characteristics. For instances
-where mvendorid and marchid are readable, that would be taken to be
-a Standards-mandatory "declaration" that the architecture has *no*
-Custom Extensions.
+Coming out of the software-related proposal by Jacob Bachmeyer, which
+hinged on the idea of a globally-maintained gcc / binutils database
+that kept and coordinated architectural encodings (curated by the Free
+Software Foundation), was to quite simply make the mvendorid and marchid
+CSRs have WARL (writeable) characteristics. For instances where mvendorid
+and marchid are readable, that would be taken to be a Standards-mandatory
+"declaration" that the architecture has *no* Custom Extensions.
This incredibly simple non-invasive idea has some unique and distinct
advantages over other proposals:
by comparison).
Also pointed out was that in certain cases pipeline stalls could be introduced
-during the switching phase, if needed.
+during the switching phase, if needed.
**This is the only one of the proposals that meet the full requirements**
TBD - [[ioctl]] for full details, summary kept here
+This proposal basically mirrors the concept of POSIX ioctls, providing
+(arbitrarily) 8 functions (opcodes) whose meaning may be over-ridden
+in an object-orientated fashion by calling an "open handle" (and close)
+function (instruction) that switches (redirects) the 8 functions over to
+different opcodes.
+
+The proposal is functionally near-identical to that of the mvendor/march-id
+except extended down to individual opcodes. As such it could hypothetically
+be proposed as an independent Standard Extension in its own right that extends
+the Custom Opcode space *or* fits into the brownfield spaces within the
+existing ISA opcode space.
+
+One of the reasons for seeking an extension of the Custom opcode space is
+that the Custom opcode space is severely limited: only 2 opcodes are free
+within the 32-bit space, and only four total remain in the 48 and 64-bit
+space.
+
+Despite the proposal (which is still undergoing clarification)
+being worthwhile in its own right, and standing on its own merits and
+thus definitely worthwhile pursuing, it is non-trivial and much more
+invasive than the mvendor/march-id WARL concept.
+
# Discussion and analysis
TBD
# Conclusion
-TBD
+In the early sections (those in the category "no action") it was established
+in each case that the problem is not solved. Avoidance of responsibility,
+or conflation of "not our problem" with "no problem" does not make "problem"
+go away.
+
+The first idea considered which could fix the problem was to just use
+the pre-existing MISA CSR, however this was determined not to have
+the right coverage (Standard Extensions only), and also crucially it
+destroyed state. Whilst unworkable it did lead to the first "workable"
+solution, "MISA-like".
+
+The "MISA-like" proposal, whilst meeting most of the requirements, led to
+a better idea: "mvendor/march-id WARL", which, in combination with an offshoot
+idea related to gcc and binutils, is the only proposal that fully meets the
+requirements.
+
+The "ioctl-like" idea *also* solves the problem, but, unlike the WARL idea
+does not meet the full requirements to be "non-invasive" and "backwards
+compatible" with pre-existing (pre-Standards-finalised) implementations.
+It does however stand on its own merit as a way to extend the extremely
+small Custom Extension opcode space, even if it itself implemented *as*
+a Custom Extension.
+
+Overall the mvendor/march-id WARL idea meets the three requirements,
+and is the only idea that meets the three requirements:
+
+* **Any proposal must be a minimal change with minimal (or zero) impact**
+ (met through being purely a single change to the specification:
+ mvendor/march-id changes from read-only to WARL)
+* **Any proposal should place no restriction on existing or future
+ ISA encoding space**
+ (met because it is just a change to one pre-existing CSR)
+* **Any proposal should take into account that there are existing implementors
+ of the (yet to be finalised but still "partly frozen") Standard who may
+ resist, for financial investment reasons, efforts to make any change
+ (at all) that could cost them immediate short-term profits.**
+ (met because existing implementations, with the exception of those
+ that have Custom Extensions, come under the "vendor/arch-id read only
+ is a declaration of having no Custom Extensions" fall-back category)
+
+So to summarise:
+
+* The consequences of not tackling this are severe: the RISC-V Foundation
+ cannot take a back seat. If it does, clear historical precedent shows
+ 100% what the outcome will be (1).
+* The retro-fitting cost onto existing implementations (even though the
+ specification has not been finalised) is negligeable
+ (changes to words in the specification)
+* The benefits are clear (pain-free transition path for vendors to safely
+ upgrade over time; no fights over Custom opcode space; no hassle for
+ software toolchain; no hassle for GNU/Linux Distros)
+* The implementation details are clear (and problem-free except for
+ vendors who insist on deploying dozens of conflicting Custom Extensions:
+ an extreme unlikely outlier).
+* Compliance Testing is straightforward and allows vendors to seek and
+ obtain *multiple* Compliance Certificates with past, present and future
+ variants of the RISC-V Standard (in the exact same processor), in order
+ support legacy customers and provide same customers with a way to avoid
+ "impossible-to-make" decisions that throw out ultra-expensive multi-decade
+ proprietary legacy software at the same as the hardware.
# Conversation Exerpts
> and typically the choice was "neither". Nobody wants to put in the
> effort when there is uncertainty and a market fragmented into
> small bits.
+>
> Note how Intel did not screw up. When SSE was added, MMX remained.
> Software vendors could trust that instructions would be supported.
> Both MMX and SSE remain today, in all shipping processors. With very