add isa conflict resolution page
[libreriscv.git] / isa_conflict_resolution.mdwn
1 # Resolving ISA conflicts and providing a pain-free RISC-V Standards Upgrade Path
2
3 In a lengthy thread that ironically was full of conflict indicative
4 of the future direction in which RISC-V will go if left unresolved,
5 multiple Custom Extensions were noted to be permitted free rein to
6 introduce global binary-encoding conflict with no means of resolution
7 described or endorsed by the RISC-V Standard: a practice that has known
8 disastrous and irreversible consequences for any architecture that
9 permits such practices (1).
10
11 Much later on in the discussion it was realised that there is also no way
12 within the current RISC-V Specification to transition to improved versions
13 of the standard, regardless of whether the fixes are absolutely critical
14 show-stoppers or whether they are just keeping the standard up-to-date (2).
15
16 It was also pointed out that Compliance is an extremely important factor
17 to take into consideration, and that Custom Extensions (as being optional)
18 effectively fall entirely outside of the Compliance Testing. At this
19 point in the discussion however it was not yet noted the stark problem
20 that the *mandatory* RISC-V Specification also faces, by virtue of there
21 being no transitional way to bring in show-stopping critical alterations.
22
23 To put this into perspective, just taking into account hardware costs
24 alone: with production mask charges for 28nm being around USD $1.5m,
25 engineering development costs and licensing of RTLs for peripherals
26 being of a similar magnitude, no manufacturer is going to back away
27 from selling a "flawed" or "legacy" product (whether it complies with
28 the RISC-V Specification or not) without a bitter fight.
29
30 It was also pointed out that there will be significant software tool
31 maintenance costs for manufacturers, meaning that the probability will
32 be extremely high that they will refuse to shoulder such costs, and
33 publish hopelessly out-of-date unpatched tools. This practice is
34 well-known to result in security flaws going unpatched, with one
35 of many immediate consequences being that product gets discarded into
36 landfill.
37
38 All and any of the issues that were discussed, and all of those that
39 were not, can be avoided by providing a forwards and backwards
40 compatible transition path between the current and future *mandatory*
41 parts of revisions of the RISC-V ISA Standard.
42
43 The rest of the discussion - indicative as it was of the stark mutually
44 exclusive gap being faced by the RISC-V ISA Standard given that it does
45 not cope with the problem - was an effort by two groups in two clear
46 camps: one that wanted things to remain as they are, and another that
47 made efforts to point out that the consequences of not taking action
48 are clearly extreme and irreversible (which, unfortunately, given the
49 severity, some of the first group were unable to believe, despite there
50 being clear historical precedent for the same mistake being made in
51 other architectures).
52
53 However after a significant amount of time, certain clear requirements came
54 out of the discussion:
55
56 * Any proposal must be a minimal change with minimal (or zero) impact
57 * Any proposal should place no restriction on existing or future
58 ISA encoding space
59 * Any proposal should take into account that there are existing implementors
60 of the (yet to be finalised but still "partly frozen") Standard who may
61 resist, for financial investment reasons, efforts to make any change
62 (at all) that could cost them immediate short-term profits.
63
64 Several proposals were put forward (and some are still under discussion)
65
66 * "Do nothing": problem is not severe: no action needed.
67 * "Do nothing": problem is out-of-scope for RISC-V Foundation.
68 * "MISA": the MISA CSR enables and disables extensions already: use that
69 * "MISA-like": a new CSR which switches in and out new encodings
70 (without destroying state)
71 * "mvendorid/marchid WARL": switching the entire "identity" of a machine
72 * "ioctl-like": a OO proposal based around the linux kernel "ioctl" system.
73
74 Each of these will be discussed below in their own sections.
75
76 # Do nothing (no problem exists)
77
78 TBD
79
80 # Do nothing (out of scope)
81
82 TBD
83
84 # MISA
85
86 TBD
87
88 # MISA-like
89
90 TBD
91
92 # mvendorid/marchid WARL
93
94 TBD
95
96 # ioctl-like
97
98 TBD
99
100 # Discussion and analysis
101
102 TBD
103
104 # Conclusion
105
106 TBD
107
108 # Conversation Exerpts
109
110 The following conversation exerpts are taken from the ISA-dev discussion
111
112 ## (1) Albert Calahan on SPE / Altiven conflict in POWERPC
113
114 > Yes. Well, it should be blocked via legal means. Incompatibility is
115 > a disaster for an architecture.
116 >
117 > The viability of PowerPC was badly damaged when SPE was
118 > introduced. This was a vector instruction set that was incompatible
119 > with the AltiVec instruction set. Software vendors had to choose,
120 > and typically the choice was "neither". Nobody wants to put in the
121 > effort when there is uncertainty and a market fragmented into
122 > small bits.
123 > Note how Intel did not screw up. When SSE was added, MMX remained.
124 > Software vendors could trust that instructions would be supported.
125 > Both MMX and SSE remain today, in all shipping processors. With very
126 > few exceptions, Intel does not ship chips with missing functionality.
127 > There is a unified software ecosystem.
128 >
129 > This goes beyond the instruction set. MMU functionality also matters.
130 > You can add stuff, but then it must be implemented in every future CPU.
131 > You can not take stuff away without harming the architecture.
132
133 ## (2) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton on Standards backwards-compatibility
134
135 > For the case where "legacy" variants of the RISC-V Standard are
136 > backwards-forwards-compatibly supported over a 10-20 year period in
137 > Industrial and Military/Goverment-procurement scenarios (so that the
138 > impossible-to-achieve pressure is off to get the spec ABSOLUTELY
139 > correct, RIGHT now), nobody would expect a seriously heavy-duty amount
140 > of instruction-by-instruction switching: it'd be used pretty much once
141 > and only once at boot-up (or once in a Hypervisor Virtual Machine
142 > client) and that's it.
143
144 ## (3) Allen Baum on Standards Compliance
145
146 > Putting my compliance chair hat on: One point that was made quite
147 > clear to me is that compliance will only test that an implementation
148 > correctly implements the portions of the spec that are mandatory, and
149 > the portions of the spec that are optional and the implementor claims
150 > it is implementing. It will test nothing in the custom extension space,
151 > and doesn't monitor or care what is in that space.
152