start filling in
[libreriscv.git] / isa_conflict_resolution.mdwn
1 # Resolving ISA conflicts and providing a pain-free RISC-V Standards Upgrade Path
2
3 In a lengthy thread that ironically was full of conflict indicative
4 of the future direction in which RISC-V will go if left unresolved,
5 multiple Custom Extensions were noted to be permitted free rein to
6 introduce global binary-encoding conflict with no means of resolution
7 described or endorsed by the RISC-V Standard: a practice that has known
8 disastrous and irreversible consequences for any architecture that
9 permits such practices (1).
10
11 Much later on in the discussion it was realised that there is also no way
12 within the current RISC-V Specification to transition to improved versions
13 of the standard, regardless of whether the fixes are absolutely critical
14 show-stoppers or whether they are just keeping the standard up-to-date (2).
15
16 It was also pointed out that Compliance is an extremely important factor
17 to take into consideration, and that Custom Extensions (as being optional)
18 effectively fall entirely outside of the Compliance Testing. At this
19 point in the discussion however it was not yet noted the stark problem
20 that the *mandatory* RISC-V Specification also faces, by virtue of there
21 being no transitional way to bring in show-stopping critical alterations.
22
23 To put this into perspective, just taking into account hardware costs
24 alone: with production mask charges for 28nm being around USD $1.5m,
25 engineering development costs and licensing of RTLs for peripherals
26 being of a similar magnitude, no manufacturer is going to back away
27 from selling a "flawed" or "legacy" product (whether it complies with
28 the RISC-V Specification or not) without a bitter fight.
29
30 It was also pointed out that there will be significant software tool
31 maintenance costs for manufacturers, meaning that the probability will
32 be extremely high that they will refuse to shoulder such costs, and
33 publish hopelessly out-of-date unpatched tools. This practice is
34 well-known to result in security flaws going unpatched, with one
35 of many immediate consequences being that product gets discarded into
36 landfill.
37
38 All and any of the issues that were discussed, and all of those that
39 were not, can be avoided by providing a forwards and backwards
40 compatible transition path between the current and future *mandatory*
41 parts of revisions of the RISC-V ISA Standard.
42
43 The rest of the discussion - indicative as it was of the stark mutually
44 exclusive gap being faced by the RISC-V ISA Standard given that it does
45 not cope with the problem - was an effort by two groups in two clear
46 camps: one that wanted things to remain as they are, and another that
47 made efforts to point out that the consequences of not taking action
48 are clearly extreme and irreversible (which, unfortunately, given the
49 severity, some of the first group were unable to believe, despite there
50 being clear historical precedent for the same mistake being made in
51 other architectures).
52
53 However after a significant amount of time, certain clear requirements came
54 out of the discussion:
55
56 * Any proposal must be a minimal change with minimal (or zero) impact
57 * Any proposal should place no restriction on existing or future
58 ISA encoding space
59 * Any proposal should take into account that there are existing implementors
60 of the (yet to be finalised but still "partly frozen") Standard who may
61 resist, for financial investment reasons, efforts to make any change
62 (at all) that could cost them immediate short-term profits.
63
64 Several proposals were put forward (and some are still under discussion)
65
66 * "Do nothing": problem is not severe: no action needed.
67 * "Do nothing": problem is out-of-scope for RISC-V Foundation.
68 * "Do nothing": problem complicates Compliance Testing (and is out of scope)
69 * "MISA": the MISA CSR enables and disables extensions already: use that
70 * "MISA-like": a new CSR which switches in and out new encodings
71 (without destroying state)
72 * "mvendorid/marchid WARL": switching the entire "identity" of a machine
73 * "ioctl-like": a OO proposal based around the linux kernel "ioctl" system.
74
75 Each of these will be discussed below in their own sections.
76
77 # Do nothing (no problem exists)
78
79 TBD (basically not an option).
80
81 There were several solutions offered that fell into this category.
82 A few of them are listed in the introduction; more are listed below,
83 and it was exhaustively (and exhaustingly) established that none of
84 them are workable.
85
86 Initially it was pointed out that Fabless Semiconductor companies could
87 simply license multiple Custom Extensions and a suitable RISC-V core, and
88 modify them accordingly. The Fabless Semi Company would be responsible
89 for paying the NREs on re-developing the test vectors (as the extension
90 licensers would be extremely unlikely to do that without payment), and
91 given that said Companies have an "integration" job to do, it would
92 be reasonable to expect them to have such additional costs as well.
93
94 The costs of this approach were outlined and discussed as being
95 disproportionate and extreme compared to the actual likely cost of
96 licensing the Custom Extensions in the first place. Additionally it
97 was pointed out that not only hardware NREs would be involved but
98 custom software tools (compilers and more) would also be required
99 (and maintained separately, on the basis that upstream would not
100 accept them except under extreme pressure, and then only with
101 prejudice).
102
103 All similar schemes involving customisation of the custom extensions
104 were likewise rejected, but not before the customisation process was
105 mistakenly conflated with tne *normal* integration process of developing
106 a custom processor (Bus Architectures, Cache layouts, peripheral layouts).
107
108 The most compelling hardware-related reason (excluding the severe impact on
109 the software ecosystem) for rejecting the customisation-of-customisation
110 approach was the case where Extensions were using an instruction encoding
111 space (48-bit, 64-bit) *greater* than that which the chosen core could
112 cope with (32-bit, 48-bit).
113
114 Overall, none of the options presented were feasible, and, in addition,
115 even if they were followed through, still would result in the failure
116 of the RISC-V ecosystem due to global conflicting ISA binary-encoding
117 meanings (POWERPC's Altivec / SPE nightmare).
118
119 # Do nothing (out of scope)
120
121 TBD (basically, may not be RV Foundation's "scope", still results in
122 problem, so not an option)
123
124 This was one of the first arguments presented: The RISC-V Foundation
125 considers Custom Extensions to be "out of scope"; that "it's not their
126 problem, therefore there isn't a problem".
127
128 The logical errors in this argument were quickly enumerated: namely
129 that the RISC-V Foundation is not in control of the use-cases, such
130 that binary-encoding is a hundred percent guaranteed to occur, and
131 a hundred percent guaranteed to occur in *commodity* hardware where
132 Debian, Fedora, SUSE and other distros will be hardest hit by the
133 resultant chaos, and that will just be the more "visible" aspect of
134 the underlying problem.
135
136 # Do nothing (Compliance too complex, therefore out of scope)
137
138 TBD (basically, may not be RV Foundation's "scope", still results in
139 problem, so not an option)
140
141 Two interestingly diametrically-opposed equally valid arguments exist here:
142
143 * Whilst Compliance testing of Custom Extensions is definitely legitimately
144 out of scope, Compliance testing of simultaneous legacy (old revisions of
145 ISA Standards) and current (new revisions of ISA Standard) definitely
146 is not. Efforts to reduce *Compliance Testing* complexity is therefore
147 "Compliance Tail Wagging Standard Dog".
148 * Beyond a certain threshold, complexity of Compliance Testing is so
149 burdensome that it risks outright rejection of the entire Standard.
150
151 Meeting these two diametrically-opposed perspectives requires that the
152 solution be very, very simple.
153
154 # MISA
155
156 TBD, basically MISA not suitable
157
158 MISA permits extensions to be disabled by masking out the relevant bit.
159 Hypothetically it could be used to disable one extension, then enable
160 another that happens to use the same binary encoding.
161
162 *However*:
163
164 * MISA Extension disabling is permitted (optionally) to **destroy**
165 the state information. Thus it is totally unsuitable for cases
166 where instructions from different Custom extensions are needed in
167 quick succession.
168 * MISA was only designed to cover Standard Extensions.
169 * There is nothing to prevent multiple Extensions being enabled
170 that wish to simultaneously interpret the same binary encoding.
171
172 Overall, whilst the MISA concept is a step in the right direction it's
173 a hundred percent unsuitable for solving the problem.
174
175 # MISA-like
176
177 TBD, basically same as mvend/march WARL except needs an extra CSR where
178 mv/ma doesn't.
179
180 # mvendorid/marchid WARL
181
182 TBD paraphrase and clarify
183
184 > In an earlier part of the thread someone kindly pointed out that MISA
185 > already switches out entire sets of instructions [which interacts at the
186 > "decode" phase]. However it was noted after a few days of investigating
187 > that particular lead that:
188 >
189 > * MISA Extension disabling is permitted (optionally) to DESTROY the state
190 > information (which means that it *has* to be re-initialised just to be
191 > safe... mistake in the standard, there), and * MISA was only designed
192 > to cover Standard Extensions.
193 >
194 > So the practice of switching extensions in and out - and the resultant
195 > "disablement" and "enablement" at the *instruction decode phase* is
196 > *already* a hard requirement as part of conforming with the present
197 > RISC-V Specification.
198 >
199 > Around the same MISA discussion, someone else also kindly pointed out
200 > that one solution to the heavyweight nature of the switching would
201 > be to deliberately introduce a pipeline stall whilst the switching is
202 > occurring: I can see the sense in that approach, even if I don't know the
203 > full details of what each implementor might choose to do. They may even
204 > choose two, or three, or N pipeline stalls: it really doesn't matter,
205 > as it's an implementors' choice (and problem to solve).
206 >
207 > So yes it's pretty heavy-duty... and also already required.
208 >
209 > For the case where "legacy" variants of the RISC-V Standard are
210 > backwards-forwards-compatibly supported over a 10-20 year period
211 > in Industrial and Military/Goverment-procurement scenarios (so that
212 > the impossible-to-achieve pressure is off to get the spec ABSOLUTELY
213 > correct, RIGHT now), nobody would expect a seriously heavy-duty amount
214 > of instruction-by-instruction switching: it'd be used pretty much once
215 > and only once at boot-up (or once in a Hypervisor Virtual Machine client)
216 > and that's it.
217 >
218 > I can however foresee instances where implementors would actually
219 > genuinely want a bank of operations to be carried out using one extension,
220 > followed immediately by another bank from a (conflicting binary-encoding)
221 > extension, in an inner loop: Software-defined MPEG / MP4 decode to call
222 > DCT block decode Custom Extension followed immediately by Custom Video
223 > Processing Extension followed immediately by Custom DSP Processing
224 > Extension to do YUV-to-RGB conversion for example is something that
225 > is clearly desirable. Solving that one would be entiiirely their
226 > problem... and the RISC-V Specification really really should give them
227 > the space to do that in a clear-cut unambiguous way.
228
229 # ioctl-like
230
231 TBD - [[ioctl]] for full details, summary kept here
232
233 # Discussion and analysis
234
235 TBD
236
237 # Conclusion
238
239 TBD
240
241 # Conversation Exerpts
242
243 The following conversation exerpts are taken from the ISA-dev discussion
244
245 ## (1) Albert Calahan on SPE / Altiven conflict in POWERPC
246
247 > Yes. Well, it should be blocked via legal means. Incompatibility is
248 > a disaster for an architecture.
249 >
250 > The viability of PowerPC was badly damaged when SPE was
251 > introduced. This was a vector instruction set that was incompatible
252 > with the AltiVec instruction set. Software vendors had to choose,
253 > and typically the choice was "neither". Nobody wants to put in the
254 > effort when there is uncertainty and a market fragmented into
255 > small bits.
256 > Note how Intel did not screw up. When SSE was added, MMX remained.
257 > Software vendors could trust that instructions would be supported.
258 > Both MMX and SSE remain today, in all shipping processors. With very
259 > few exceptions, Intel does not ship chips with missing functionality.
260 > There is a unified software ecosystem.
261 >
262 > This goes beyond the instruction set. MMU functionality also matters.
263 > You can add stuff, but then it must be implemented in every future CPU.
264 > You can not take stuff away without harming the architecture.
265
266 ## (2) Luke Kenneth Casson Leighton on Standards backwards-compatibility
267
268 > For the case where "legacy" variants of the RISC-V Standard are
269 > backwards-forwards-compatibly supported over a 10-20 year period in
270 > Industrial and Military/Goverment-procurement scenarios (so that the
271 > impossible-to-achieve pressure is off to get the spec ABSOLUTELY
272 > correct, RIGHT now), nobody would expect a seriously heavy-duty amount
273 > of instruction-by-instruction switching: it'd be used pretty much once
274 > and only once at boot-up (or once in a Hypervisor Virtual Machine
275 > client) and that's it.
276
277 ## (3) Allen Baum on Standards Compliance
278
279 > Putting my compliance chair hat on: One point that was made quite
280 > clear to me is that compliance will only test that an implementation
281 > correctly implements the portions of the spec that are mandatory, and
282 > the portions of the spec that are optional and the implementor claims
283 > it is implementing. It will test nothing in the custom extension space,
284 > and doesn't monitor or care what is in that space.
285